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DISCUSSION OF RECENT DECISIONS
combination of functions has been tolerated as not violative of due process
largely for the practical reason that any separation of the functions would
require a complete change of the entire administrative system.
For example, to help insure fair hearings on the federal level, the Fed-
eral Administrative Procedure Act,30 § 5 (c) provides for internal separation,
that is, while the agency itself performs all the aforementioned functions,
the subordinate agency personnel who act as deciders of a particular case
are to have no part in its investigation and prosecution.
Thus, it is quite clear that the principles adopted by the majority in
deciding the Pickering case conform to those postulated in the earlier de-
cisions. The courts are loath to interfere with the actions of local school
boards and will apparently do so only when they are convinced that a
school board has acted arbitrarily in a particular case. The court was unim-
pressed with the free speech argument which Pickering attempted to raise
and as such suggested that a teacher's freedom might, of necessity, have to
be compromised in favor of the broader social need of an efficient and
harmonious school system. As has so often been true, the court was con-
fronted with a situation wherein it had to resolve a clash between the
interests of the individual and those of the larger community. This writer
believes that the court correctly chose to protect the greater community
interest.
EDWARD A. HOFFMAN
HUSBAND AND WIFE-MARITAL RIGHTS-VOLUNTARY CONVEYANCE OF
REAL PROPERTY BY EITHER PARTY TO A MARRIAGE CONTRACT WITHOUT
KNOWLEDGE OF OTHER Is FRAUD AND CONVEYANCE WILL BE SET ASIDE AS
VOID. In Michna v. May, 80 Ill. App. 2d 281, 225 N.E.2d 391 (Ist Dist. 1967),
the Appellate Court for the First District of the State of Illinois was pre-
sented with the question of whether a voluntary conveyance of real property
by the prospective husband without knowledge of the prospective wife was
a fraud on the marital rights of the prospective wife. The court held the
conveyance was a fraud on the wife's marital rights and was without effect.
The plaintiff-widow was engaged to be married on December 19, 1955.
On January 10, 1956, her intended husband executed a land trust, whereby
the trustee held title to the real estate for the benefit of the grantor for life
and, on his death, the remainder would go to his sisters, the defendants.
The parties were married on January 23, 1956, and lived together until
May 6, 1961, when the husband died, leaving a will naming the plaintiff as
his sole beneficiary and executor. Upon learning of the trust agreement, the
plaintiff filed a complaint seeking to set the agreement aside on grounds of
30 60 Stat. 237, 5 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1011 (1946).
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fraud. The Circuit Court of Cook County held the conveyance to be null
and void. On appeal, the appellate court affirmed the decision.
At common law, married women were incapable of holding property
in their own name. At common law, the husband acquired large interests
in the real property of the wife.' This interest, known as the husband's
marital right, lasted only during the marriage and expired on the death of
the wife. Consequently, a conveyance of real property by a woman about
to marry, made without knowledge of the intended husband,2 with intent
to defeat his marital right, was a fraud upon him and he could have the
transfer set aside after the marriage by a suit in equity.3 At common law,
fraudulent conveyances were made by the woman either by transferring
her property to a third party for her sole and separate use,4 or by changing
the form of the property, so as to reduce the extent of the husband's interest
therein. Modern statutes, however, have modified the rights of the husband
to his wife's property,5 and there has been less occasion for practicing fraud
upon the husband.
United States equity courts at an early date extended to the wife the
same rights that her husband had at common law.6 Today, a secret transfer
of realty by the prospective husband may be upset as a violation of the
wife's martial rights.
The marital rights of the wife in Illinois are her rights to dower and
homestead.7 They are inchoate rights and attach on death as to all property
held by the husband during coverture. In order for the wife to give up
these rights, she must join with the husband in any conveyance. Thus, it
can be seen that a conveyance on the "eve of marriage" by the husband
without the knowledge of the wife would deprive the wife of her dower
and homestead interest in that specific property and it has been therefore
held that such a conveyance is prima facie evidence of fraud of these marital
rights.8
1 2 Kent Comm. 135, Grute v. Loonoft, Cro. Eliz. 287 (1592). In that case, the husband
did not become owner of the wife's real estate, but during marriage was entitled to the
enjoyment of his wife's chattels and could assign, mortgage or otherwise dispose of them
during his life.
2 There can be no presumption of fraud where the intended husband has knowledge
or assents to the disposition. Hunt v. Mathews, 1 Vern 408 (1686), Slocombe v. Glubb, 2
Brown Ch. 544 (1789).
3 Ramsey v. Joyce, McMul. Eg. (S. Car.) 236, 37 Am. Dec. 550 (1841); Waller v. Arm-
istead, 2 Leigh (Va.) 11, 2 Am. Dec. 594 (1830).
4 See England v. Downs, 2 Beavan 522 (1840), where the wife during a marriage con-
tract secretly conveyed away all her property in such a manner as to defeat her husband's
marital right, but secured to herself separate use of the property.
5 Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 68, § 9 (1874).
6 Chandler v. Hollingsworth, 3 Del. Ch. 99 (1867).
7 Knights v. Knights, 300 I1. 618, 133 N.E. 377 (1921).
8 Dunbar v. Dunbar, 254 111. 281, 98 N.E. 563 (1912). The conveyance made before
marriage in fraud of the wife is comparative to one made to defraud creditors of the
grantor and both would be set aside.
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In announcing its rule, the court in Michna purported to follow the
earlier Illinois Supreme Court case of Moore v. Moore.9 In that case, a
widow alleged that her deceased spouse conveyed title to a certain farm on
the "eve" of their marriage, without her knowledge or consent, to his son
and two daughters by a previous marriage. She asked that such convey-
ance be set aside as it deprived her of her marital rights. The deed had
been executed and recorded ten months before the marriage. The court
stated:
It is the settled law in the state that a voluntary conveyance
by either party to a marriage contract of his or her real property,
without the knowledge of the other and on the eve of marriage, is
a fraud upon the marital rights of the other party, and such con-
veyance may be set aside as fraudulent and void as against the
party whose marital rights are precluded thereby. 10
One of the problems is what is considered the "eve of marriage." There
can be no arbitrary line of demarcation as to the time between a fraudulent
and valid transfer; therefore, the court determines what is the "eve of mar-
riage" by the special circumstances involved in each case. The length of
time between the transfer and the marriage is one of the factors considered.
Thus, in Freeman v. Hartman," a voluntary conveyance of a one-sixth
interest in a farm made three days before marriage without the knowledge
of the prospective spouse was held to be on the "eve." However, even a long
period of time has been held to be on the "eve of marriage." This is illus-
trated aptly in Jarvis v. Jarvis.12 In that case the conveyance was made
twenty-two months prior to the marriage. Notwithstanding this consider-
able length of time, the court held the conveyance to be on the "eve of
marriage" as the husband was actually intending marriage at the time.
Another criterion used by the courts in determining whether a con-
veyance was made on the "eve of marriage" is whether the prospective
husband was contemplating marriage at the time he made the conveyance.' 3
Clearly, if the husband has no intent, even remotely, to marry, there can be
no fraud on the wife. In Ellet v. Farmer,14 where there was a transfer by a
prospective spouse to his nephew and niece, his closest relatives, two months
after his first wife's death and a year prior to his second marriage, the court
said,
Manifestly, he did not then contemplate marriage with plain-
tiff who was living with her third husband, Harry Hart, and, who,
so far as the record discloses, was in excellent health. The evidence
adduced by plaintiff does not even remotely tend to show an intent
by Ellet to marry any particular person or a general intent to
9 15 I11. 2d 239, 154 N.E.2d 256 (1958).
10 Id. at 241, 154 N.E.2d at 257.
11 45 Ill. 57 (1867).
12 286 Il1. 478, 122 N.E. 121 (1919).
13 See also, Lill v. Lill, 18 Ill. 2d 393, 164 N.E.2d 12 (1961).
14 384 I1. 343, 51 N.E.2d 570 (1944).
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marry some person whom he had not yet met. In short, Ellet gave
his property to his nearest relatives, the special objects of his affec-
tion, at a time when he had the undoubted right so to do.15
However, it has been held that the prospective husband need not have
already picked a bride, to be considered as making a conveyance on the
"eve of marriage." Thus, in Higgins v. Higgins,16 the father gave a deed
to his son. He thereafter went to New York and was introduced to his
prospective wife. He represented to her that he was a large landowner when
in fact he no longer owned any land. On the strength of these representa-
tions the plaintiff married. The court stated that although the husband had
never met the plaintiff, he did contemplate this second marriage and the
deed was made with a view to that event.
17
Once a prima facie case is established, the only way to defeat it is for
the grantee to prove that the conveyance was made for a valid reason and
not in fraud of the spouse.' 8 A valid reason was found in Daniher v.
Daniher.19 In that case, the husband's son by a former marriage had been
in possession of the farm involved for three years before his father's second
marriage and had made permanent and lasting improvements upon it. The
court held that the father had a duty, as consideration for the improve-
ments, to make the conveyance and that the son had sustained the burden
of showing that the transfer was for a valid reason.
2 0
The decision in the Michna case is in accord with the holdings of the
vast majority of states.21 However, the decision raises certain questions. The
15 Id. at 349, 51 N.E.2d at 573.
16 219 Ill. 146, 76 N.E. 86 (1905).
17 The court in the Higgins case, supra note 16, reversed and remanded the decision
after a trial court decision in favor of the plaintiff. The court denied relief because the
evidence presented at the trial was that the deed was made prior to the marriage and was
thus at variance with the plaintiff's pleadings which indicated the deed was made subse-
quent to marriage.
18 Supra note 13. There is some amount of controversy as to what constitutes a prima
facie case in the various jurisdictions. In Smigell v. Brod, 366 Pa. 612, 79 A.2d 411 (1951),
the court held that mere proof of a conveyance made during an engagement without the
knowledge of the wife does not constitute a prima facie case, but the party complaining
must actually prove fraud. See also, Tracy v. Thatchen, 135 Kan. 615, 11 P.2d 691 (1932)
where when a wife could show no fraudulent intent, the evidence was held insufficient.
19 201 Ill. 489, 66 N.E. 239 (1903).
20 Accord, Lill v. Lill, supra note 13, where the husband had conveyed property to
his son one year and five months before his second marriage. The court held the convey-
ance valid. Although the conveyance was prima facie fraudulent in Illinois, the proof by
the son that the father had no general intent to marry at the time of the conveyance
and that it was his intent to provide for his children from a prior marriage, showed that
there was no fraud in the conveyance. See also, Jones v. Jones, 213 Ill. 228, 72 N.E. 695
(1904), where the Illinois court held that a conveyance given shortly before marriage
would not be in fraud of the marital right of the prospective wife when it was given for
services rendered by the grantee. But see, Stathos v. La Salle Nat'l Bank, 62 111. App. 2d
398, 210 N.E.2d 828 (lst Dist. 1965), where the court held that if there was only a possi-
bility of another reason for transferring the property, there may still be a presumption
of fraud.
21 States in accord with rule include: Alabama, Arkansas, Colorado, Delaware, Florida,
DISCUSSION OF RECENT DECISIONS
court, in holding the conveyance void as a fraud on the wife's marital right,
must decide the extent of the wife's interest. Would she be entitled to the
entire property or could she only receive her marital interests? The general
rule is that the conveyance may be avoided to the extent of the wife's
marital right.22 Some courts hold, however, that in such an action the con-
veyance will be totally set aside, thereby preserving all rights to the property
that the defrauded wife might have had.3 But, in neither case, does it
appear she will receive all the property unless her interest corresponds
accordingly.
If the conveyance were set aside completely, what rights would the
creditors of the deceased have to the property? After making the conveyance,
the husband loses all interest in the property. Thus, since the conveyance
was made only to defraud the wife, and the creditors' right to the property
depended on the husband's title, it follows that since the husband had by
the conveyance forfeited all of his rights to the property, the creditors would
not be entitled to share.
The next question to be answered is what are the wife's rights if the
husband conveyed to a bona fide purchaser who took for value and without
notice of the husband's intent to defraud? As a general rule, the conveyance
will not be set aside. 24 However, would not the wife be entitled to a priority
in funds given by the purchaser for the property? Seemingly, the equitable
finding would hold the wife to be entitled to a claim, ahead of the creditors,
in the funds. The reason is that, but for the fraudulent conveyance, these
funds never would have been in the husband's estate. They would still be
in the form of property, to which the wife would have her marital right in
prior to claims by the creditors.
One of the dangers of the Michna decision is that wives who feel that
they have not been justly provided for after their husband's death can claim
they had not knowledge of a conveyance made prior to marriage. This will
transfer the burden of proof to the innocent grantee who may be unable to
remove the taint of fraud from the conveyance. Such a rule may well have
paved the way for fraudulent practices on the part of the wife and other
parties.
ALADAR F. SiIJs
Indiana, Iowa, Kentucky, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Mississippi, Missouri, New
Jersey, New York, North Carolina, Ohio, West Virginia, Wisconsin.
22 Martin v. Martin, 282 Ky. 411, 138 S.W.2d 509 (1940); Harrison v. Harrison, 198
Ark. 64, 127 S.W.2d 270 (1939); Beechley v. Beechley, 154 Iowa 75, 108 N.W. 762 (1906).
23 In the case of inchoate dower, the interest is difficult to calculate, and thus some
courts feel it better to set aside the conveyance in toto to protect all the wife's interests.
Vondick v. Kirsch, 216 S.W. 519 (Sup. Ct. Mo., 1919).
24 Kelly v. McGraft, 70 Ala. 75 (1881). If, however, it appears that the purchaser
participated in the fraudulent intent of the husband, the conveyance will be set aside.
Freeman v. Hartman, 45 Ill. 57 (1867).

